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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 860250

vs.
CALEEN LOWE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in allowing an expert

witness to testify as to his opinion that a combination of
physical

injuries,

as

defined

in

76-5-109(1)(b),

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended, together with an environmental setting created a substantial risk of death as used in 76-5-109(1)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
2.

Was

there

sufficient

evidence

to

convict

the

Defendant of child abuse, a second degree felony, or should the
conviction have been for child abuse, a class A misdemeanor?
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Child Abuse, a
Second Degree Felony.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On February 27, 1986, the Appellant was convicted by
jury verdict after a four and one-half day trial in Iron County.
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The

Appellant

requested

the

preparation

of

a

Pre-Sentence

Report and on April 1, 198 6, she appeared before the Court and
was sentenced to a term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks a reversal of her conviction and
release from incarceration, or, in the alternative, a reduction
in the severity of the offense from a Second Degree Felony to a
Class A Misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant/Appellant, Caleen Lowe Jones, together
with her sixteen month old son, Jacob Hart Jones, moved into a
trailer house located in the Cedar Valley area of Iron County
some seven miles northwest of Cedar City in late April of 1985
(Transcript, Vol. 4, 56-57).

The other occupant of the house

trailer was James Chad Anderson, a Co-Defendant in the action
who, during the trial, pled guilty to the third degree felony
offense of child abuse (T.169-171) and was later sentenced to the
Utah State Prison for a period of time not to exceed five years,
with the recommendation of the Court to the Board of Corrections
that Mr. Anderson serve the entire five years.

On May 19, 1985,

while the Defendant/Appellant, Caleen Lowe Jones, was at the
Valley View Medical Center in Cedar City having a broken hand
cast by emergency room personnel

(T. Vol. 4, 62), James Chad

Anderson had the physical care and supervision of Jacob Hart
Jones(T.170).

At that time, Jacob Hart Jones was burned on his
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lower left leg by contacting the hot door of a clothes dryer
located in the bathroom area of the home (T.97, 170). It is this
burn together with an injury to the bridge of the nose to which
the Defendant, James Chad Anderson, entered his plea of guilty
(T.170).

The burn was a large one and second degree in severity

(T.99) .
On May 20, 1985, the Defendant/Appellant noticed the
presence of the burn on her son's leg and took him to the Valley
View

Medical

Center

where

he

was

treated

by

nurses

and

Dr. Michael Stultz in the emergency room of the Valley View
Medical Center

(T.96).

The nurses testified

that the child

appeared to have little separation anxiety when taken from his
mother and exhibited stoic behavior when his burn was washed and
bandaged (T.421-423).

This behavior was described by the nurses

on subsequent visits to the Valley View Medical

Center for

follow-up treatment on May 21, 22, and 2 3rd, though on May 23rd,
the Co-Defendant James Chad Anderson took the child into the
hospital (T.427-428, 439-442).

During the period of time from

May 20, 1986, until May 25, 1986, pursuant to the instruction of
law enforcement officials and the instructions of Mr. Kerry Hedin
(T.459)

of

the

Division

of

Family

Services, the Defendant/

Appellant, Caleen Lowe Jones, resided outside of the trailer
house that she had shared with James Chad Anderson. During that
time she and her son lived with a cousin, though they often
visited in the trailer house occupied by Mr. Anderson (T. Vol. 4,
74).

On May 25, 1985, the Defendant/Appellant, Caleen Lowe
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Jones, moved back into the trailer house with James Chad Anderson
(T.80).

On May

30, 1985, near midnight, Mrs. Jones and the

Co-Defendant, James Chad Anderson, rushed Jacob Hart Jones back
to the emergency room of the Valley View Medical Center.

At the

time that Jacob Hart Jones was taken to the Valley View Medical
Center emergency room, he was in full cardio-pulmonary arrest
(T. 394-395).
resuscitate

The personnel at the medical center were able to
(T.201)

Jacob

Hart

Jones

and

he was

thereafter

transferred to Primary Childrens Hospital in Salt Lake City where
he died on June 1, 1985, the doctors having determined that the
child was brain-dead (T.274).

Certain additional injuries were

observed when the child returned to Valley View Medical Center on
May 31, 1985, which were not observed when the child was seen on
May 20, 1985.
The office of the State Medical Examiner determined
that the child died of natural causes, noting the presence of
Neisseria meningitis bacteria in the blood stream, together with
pancreatitis and pneumonia (T.349-350).

Witnesses offered by the

State expressed their opinion that the child died from severe
edema of the brain (T.350).

The testimony of the Co-Defendant

James Chad Anderson was that on the night of May 30, 198 5, he put
the child to bed and when checking on the child some half an hour
to forty five minutes later found that Jacob Hart Jones had
stopped breathing.
At the trial of the case, Dr. William Martin Palmer of
the Primary Childrens Medical Center testified that none of the
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injuries found on Jacob Hart Jones (ranging from the large burn
inflicted by the dryer to small burns on the fingers and including various bruises and excoriations on the soles of the feet)
would

create

a

permanent

disfigurement,

protracted

loss

or

impairment of a function of a body member, limb or organ, or
substantial risk of death (T.318-320).

However, Dr. Palmer was

allowed to testify, over the objection of counsel, that the
combination of the physical injuries noted on Jacob Hart Jones,
together with other signs of behavior noted by the hospital
personnel of the Valley View Medical Center, created for Jacob
Hart Jones an environment in which he was subjected to a substantial risk of death (T.358-361).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The

witness to testify

trial

court

erred

in

allowing

an

expert

as to his opinion that a combination of

physical injuries as defined in 76-5-109(1) (b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, together with an environmental setting
created a substantial risk of death as used in 76-5-109 (1) (c) ,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
2.

There was

insufficient evidence to convict the

Defendant of child abuse, a second degree felony, and therefore
any conviction should have been for no more than a class A
misdemeanor of child abuse.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AN EXPERT WITNESS TO
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TESTIFY AS TO HIS OPINION THAT A COMBINATION OF PHYSICAL INJURIES
AS

DEFINED

amended,

IN

76-5-109(1)(b),

TOGETHER

WITH

AN

Utah

Code

ENVIRONMENTAL

Annotated,
SETTING

1953,

as

CREATED

A

SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF DEATH AS USED IN 76-5-109 (1) (c) , Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The central issue on appeal in this particular case is
the construction of the statute 76-5-109, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.

That specific statute is set forth as follows:

76-5-109. Child abuse.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a human being who
is 17 years of age or less;
(b)
"Physical
injury"
means
impairment of the physical condition including, but not limited to, any contusion of the
skin, laceration, failure to thrive, malnutrition, burn, fracture of any bone, subdural
hematoma, injury to any internal organ, any
injury causing bleeding, or any physical
condition which imperils a child's health or
welfare;
(c) "Serious physical injury" means
any physical injury which creates a permanent
disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment
of a function of a body member, limb or
organ, or substantial risk of death.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child
serious physical injury or, having the care
and custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict serious physicl injury
upon a child is guilty of an offense as
follows:
(a)
If
done
intentionally
or
knowingly, the offense is a felony of the
second degree;
(b) If done recklessly, the offense
is a felony of the third degree;
(c) If done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child
physical injury or, having the care and
custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict physical injury upon a
child is guilty of an offense as follows:
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(a)
If
done
intentionally
or
knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) If done recklessly, the offense
is a class B misdemeanor;
(c) If done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor.
(4) Criminal actions under this section
may be prosecuted in the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been
committed,
where
the
existence
of
the
offense is discovered, where the victim
resides, or where the defendant resides.
The State's theory in this case is best set out on page
3 58 of the Trial Transcript where the prosecutor stated:
Q.
Do you have an opinion, then, as to
whether or not — well, let me back up.
In addition that we are also considering
the original physical injuries, burns and
bruises to Jacob Hart Jones, is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. All those factors combined, do
you have an opinion, then, as to whether or
not those injuries, taken in conjunction with
the other circumstances I just discussed,
presented a risk, a substantial risk of death
to the child or person of Jacob Hart Jones?
A

timely

objection

was

made

to

the

form

of

this

question and to the State's theory in presenting this evidence to
the jury by using a combination of factors to define

certain

injuries as creating a "substantial risk of death" which is a
portion

of

the

definition

of

"serious

physical

injury"

in

76-5-109(1)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
It is the contention of the defense that the injuries
observed on the person of Jacob Hart Jones, which consisted of
bruises, lacerations, and burns, did not either individually or
together create a "substantial risk of death" as defined in the
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statute.
The rules of statutory construction in criminal cases
are very clear.

76-1-106, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

states:
The rule that a penal statute is to be
strictly construed shall not apply to this
code, any of its provision, or any offense
defined by the laws of this state. All
provisions of this code and offenses defined
by the laws of this state shall be construed
according to the fair import of their terms
to promote justice and to effect the objects
of the law and general purposes of section
76-1-104.
The above statute was followed and approved in State v.
Archuletta, 526 P.2d

911

(Utah 1974).

In that case Justice

Ellett wrote, "Even though the rule of strict construction of a
criminal statute is not the law in Utah, there is nothing to
construe where there is no ambiguity in the statute."

There is

no ambiguity in subsection (c) of 76-5-109(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

The statute classifies a number of

additional factors which enhance "physical injuries" to reach the
status of "serious physical injury."

There can be no construc-

tion of the definition of "serious physical injury" that would
allow a combining of simple "physical

injuries" in order to

create a "substantial risk of death."
It would seem that the State's theory in this case
requires additional statutory language before it can be presented
to a jury as it was in this trial.
"serious physical

injury"

Under the State's theory,

would have to be defined as "any

physical injury or combination of injuries which creates a
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permanent disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment of a
function of a body member, limb or organ, or substantial risk of
death".

The statute at the present time does not have the

language

which

is underlined

above.

However,

at the

trial

of this case the State was permitted to proceed as though such
language were present and Dr. Palmer was allowed to testify that
a combination of injuries and other conditions, taken together,
created for Jacob Hart Jones a substantial risk of death (T.358361) .
II
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF CHILD ABUSE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND THEREFORE ANY
CONVICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN FOR NO MORE THAN A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR OF CHILD ABUSE.
In an evaluation of the jury verdict in this case, it
appears

that

the

jury

determined

that

the mental

state of

the Defendant was one of conduct done knowingly and intentionally.

However, such a mental state, when coupled with injuries

which are defined under 76-5-109(1)(b), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, as "physical injuries" rather than "serious
physical injuries" can support only a conviction of a class A
misdemeanor.

The testimony of the witnesses throughout the trial

was that the contusions, lacerations, and burns, did not fall
under the category of "serious physical injury" in that none of
these injuries created a "permanent disfigurement; protracted
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loss or impairment of a function of a body member, limb or
organ, or substantial risk of death".

Because of the nature of

the injuries sustained by Jacob Hart Jones, the record does not
support a conviction of any level of offense higher than a
class A misdemeanor of child abuse wherein "physical injury" was
inflicted intentionally or knowingly.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court allowed the State to continue
with a line of questioning which elicited evidence beyond the
scope of the statute, the jury was presented with a theory of
criminal

activity

not

found within the

statute

in question.

Since the conduct presented to the jury is not defined as the
more serious of the two crimes involved, the Defendant cannot be
convicted of the second degree felony offense of child abuse.
The only offense which the Defendant may be convicted of is the
class A misdemeanor of child abuse and

for that reason the

conviction must be overturned.
Respectfully submitted this 33st day of October, 1986.

^^TAMES L. S
ts'

Attorney for Appellant
110 North Main Street
P.O. Box 623
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-3772

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
-10-

of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to Mr. Earl
Dorious, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, this 31st day of October, 1986, first class
postage prepaid.

JJfflfcS L. SHUMATE
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